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The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is widely known as the most 
effective civil rights statute in history.  This is an expected 
distinction, as President Johnson asked for and ultimately signed 
the “goddamnedest toughest” legislation possible.  But the 
President and the 89th Congress could not do this important work 
alone.  They knew that the substantive provisions of the statute 
presented a difficult challenge to established constitutional norms 
and for this reason they offered a broad and expansive statutory 
canvass.  In so doing, and as this Article argues, they implicitly 
enlisted the U.S. Supreme Court as a key player in the fight against 
voting discrimination. Unsure about the constitutional boundaries 
at issue, Congress and the administration left many things unsaid, 
wishing for the Court to extend the substantive provisions of the 
Act as far as constitutionally permissible. This account turns the 
conventional wisdom on its head. The Warren Court –widely 
considered a bastion of liberal policy-making and judicial activism 
– interpreted the statute precisely in accordance to congressional 
wishes.  Yet this proved to be a risky strategy, for as soon as the 
Court’s composition changed, so did its collective view of the 
statute.  In other words, it is the Rehnquist Court who has 
demonstrated a penchant for judicial activism under the guise of 
strict constructionism. As Congress debates the upcoming 
extension of the Voting Rights Act in 2007, this is a condition of the 
Act to which Congress must close attention. 
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“Bloody Sunday” had finally pushed the government into real 
and direct action.  In response to the violence on the Pettus 
Bridge, which had been brought by the networks to living rooms 
across the country, President Johnson had had enough.1 And he 
was quite emphatic in his directive: he wanted the Department of 
Justice to “prepare the 'goddamnedest toughest' voting-rights bill 
possible.”2 And the Department of Justice did exactly that, with a 
draft that ultimately became the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  
Among its many virtues, the Act adopted a trigger formula for 
determining which jurisdictions would be covered under the 
special provisions of the Act;3 it provided for the appointment of 
federal examiners under certain conditions; and it bypassed the 
cumbersome and time-consuming judicial process in order to 
afford victims of discrimination effective access to the polls.4
Two features of the Act – its special provisions, which were 
due to expire on August 6, 1970 – were particularly effective.  One 
was the aforementioned trigger formula, which automatically 
brought within the coverage of the Act any jurisdiction that used 
 
1 See TAYLOR BRANCH, AT CANAAN’S EDGE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1965-
68, at 67 (2006) (“[President Johnson] had a politician’s respect for pressure, 
and very likely realized that the tide of reaction to Sunday’s march was beyond 
push-button control.”). 
2 Howell Raines, MY SOUL IS RESTED: MOVEMENT DAYS IN THE DEEP SOUTH 
REMEMBERED 337 (1977) (interview with Nicholas Katzenbach, Attorney General 
during the Johnson Administration). 
3 The special provisions of the bill were temporary in nature.  Under 
section 4(b), a state would be covered under the Act if it used a literacy test as a 
prerequisite to vote and its voter registration on November 1, 1964 or its voter 
turnout rate on the 1964 Presidential election dipped below fifty percent.  Those 
states caught under 4(b) of the Act would need to preclear any changes to their 
voting laws with a three judge District Court in the District of Columbia.  See 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, S. 1564, 89th Cong. § 8 (1965). 
4 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, S. 1564, 89th Cong. (1965). 
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literacy tests and either its turnout rate for the 1964 presidential 
election or its registration rate on November 1, 1964 was below 
fifty percent.5 The formula initially brought within the purview of 
the Act the states of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
South Carolina and Virginia, as well as 26 counties in North 
Carolina. A second feature was the preclearance requirement.  
Under section 5, these covered jurisdictions must submit any 
proposed change in “voting qualifications or prerequisites to 
voting, or standard, practices, or procedures” to the Department 
of Justice – or they may seek a declaratory judgment in U. S. 
District Court in the District of Columbia – for a determination 
that the change does not have the purpose and will not have the 
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race 
or color.6
To many critics of the Act, and particularly those within the 
jurisdictions that would bear the full force of its special 
provisions, the proposed legislation was too tough.  These critics 
complained loudly and often that the legislation was 
unconstitutional, as beyond the authority of Congress to enact.7
Yet criticism also came from unexpected quarters, most notably 
Solicitor General Cox.  In a memorandum to the Attorney 
General, Cox argued that the formula for determining which 
jurisdictions were covered under the Act was simply irrational.  To 
his mind, “[o]ne might equally well make the Act applicable to any 
State whose name begins with Vi or Mi or Lo or Al or Ge or So.  
Indeed,” he continued, “since even this description covers Alaska 
as well as Alabama, it has exactly the same effect as the 
determinations now required to be made.”8
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973p (2004). 
6 Id.
7 See, e.g., Voting Rights Act: Hearings on S. 1564 Before the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 57 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Senate 
Hearings] (Senator Ervin); Voting Rights Act: Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before 
Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 716 (1965) 
[hereinafter 1965 House Hearings] (statement of Representative Long). 
8 Solicitor General Cox to the Attorney General 1 (March 23, 1965) (Justice 
Department Administrative History, Civil Rights, Lyndon B. Johnson Library).  
Interestingly, during the Senate hearings on March 24, 1965, Senator Ervin 
doubted whether everyone within the Department of Justice agreed with the 
Attorney General about the constitutionality of the Act.  The Attorney General 
responded: “I can say that I have consulted on this with the top officials in the 
Department of Justice and they agree.  I include on that the Solicitor General 
who has to argue the case.”  1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 91 
(testimony of Attorney General Katzenbach); see id. at 140 (upon questioning by 
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In hindsight, it is beyond reason to have expected the 
Supreme Court to strike down this important statute.  The Court 
put all doubts to rest in Morgan9 and South Carolina,10 but the 
story of the Act and its constitutional odyssey only began with 
these cases.  To be sure, Congress and the administration went as 
far as they thought they could go; this was the “toughest” bill they 
deemed possible on both political and constitutional grounds.  Yet 
it is also clear from the historical record that the drafters of the 
bill wanted to push the provisions of the statute as far as existing 
constitutional limits allowed.  Put another way, Congress knew 
that it had the power to act; the real question was about how far 
the substantive coverage of the statute could go. 
Enter the Supreme Court.  From the moment the Court was 
asked to interpret the substantive provisions of the statute, it did 
so broadly and assertively.11 This conduct has been subject to 
much criticism; namely, that the Court has played fast and loose 
with the statutory language and what it proclaims to be the intent 
of Congress.  In other words, it is the conventional wisdom that 
the Court has filled out the contours of this broad and expansive 
statute not by the demands of traditional methods of statutory 
interpretation, but by what it determines to be sound public 
policy.12 This criticism applies with particular poignancy to the 
 
Senator Hart, the Attorney General remarked that the Solicitor General believed 
the bill to be constitutional, yet his opinion was not in written form). 
9 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
10 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
11 See Allen v. Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). 
12 See Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on S. 818, 
S. 2456, S. 2507 and Title IV of S. 2029 Before the Senate Subcomm on Const. 
Rts. of the Judiciary Committee, 91st Cong. 5 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Senate 
Hearings] (“This case (Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969)) is 
yet another example of the Court’s habit of redoing the work of Congress to 
conform with its own notions of desirable legislation.”) (Senator Ervin).  For 
some of the cases, see Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971); Georgia v. 
United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 
(1976); Reno v. Bossier Parrish School Board, 528 U.S. 320 (2000).  For 
criticisms of the Court’s approach in particular cases, see, for example, Holder v. 
Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 895-96 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 935 (“Not 
surprisingly, the legislative history relied upon in Allen also displayed the typical 
flaws that one might expect – it was hardly unequivocal.”); Allen, 393 U.S. at 
583, 585 (labeling Allen an “extremely broad construction of § 5,” and 
complaining that “the Court has now construed § 5 to require a revolutionary 
innovation in American government”) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 146 (1976) (contending 
that “the congressional purposes in § 5 are no longer served and the sacred 
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early treatment of the statute by the Warren Court and the early 
Burger Court.   
This Article turns the conventional wisdom on its head. It 
contends that the early history of the Act has played out precisely 
as Congress intended.  Out of concern for overstepping 
constitutional bounds, the administration and members of 
Congress drafted a broad statute, short on specifics and as far-
reaching as they deemed constitutionally possible.  In response to 
a question from Representative Cramer, for example, Attorney 
General Katzenbach explained: “If the Congressman can suggest 
an effective means that covers everything that is covered by this 
act and can cover other areas and still be constitutional, I am sure 
that the administration would be most happy to consider that.  We 
don’t want discrimination anywhere.”13 The Attorney General 
repeated this position often.  The broad contours of the Act were 
clear: to eliminate the “blight of racial discrimination in voting.”14 
Some witnesses and members of Congress wished for the bill to 
assert far more directly the reach of the Act,15 but the legislation 
ultimately failed to reflect these efforts.  The language remained 
broad and expansive, which offered a willing interpreter the room 
to expand the scope of the statute as necessary. 
From this record, this Article argues that Congress intended 
for the Court to extend the substantive provisions of the Act as far 
as constitutionally permissible.  To be fair, direct evidence for this 
conclusion is scarce in the early legislative history, for Congress 
could not even be sure – although the Attorney General was very 
optimistic on this score16 – whether the constitutionality of the Act 
would bear judicial scrutiny.  But Congress and the administration 
did make clear, time and again, that they wished to take the 
substantive provisions of the Act as far as constitutionally 
possible.  The Court could thus interpret the Act as broadly as it 
wished, confident in the view that Congress would support its 
interpretation.  Ironically, the temporary nature of the special 
 
guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments emerge badly 
battered”) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
13 1965 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 90. 
14 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). 
15 See, e.g., 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 192 (objecting to 
Senator Fong’s suggestion to clarify the original section 9(a) of the Act). 
16 See id. at 249 (“I think if anything [his opinion about the 
constitutionality of the bill] has been strengthened, Senator, because under such 
rigorous and learned cross examination as I have had on this point, my 
convictions remains the same, and I have confidence in the constitutionality of 
the bill.”). 
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provisions of the Act proved helpful on this score, as Congress had 
many opportunities to comment on – and demonstrate approval 
for – the Court’s handiwork.  Hence, the strategy played out 
across decades and the various extensions of the Act.   
Yet it has also has proven to be a risky strategy; while it is true 
that the Court understood its role as a conduit for congressional 
intent broadly defined and as understood early on, it is also fair to 
say that in more recent years, the Court has shown very little 
interest in remaining faithful to the intent of Congress.17
Ironically, this has meant that the Court followed the intent of 
Congress in those very cases that are traditionally considered to 
be activist decisions, while the more recent Rehnquist Court 
decisions narrowing the scope of the statute have turned away 
from that original intent. Hence the irony: the Supreme Court’s 
handling of the Voting Rights Act offers an inimitable example of 
judicial activism clothed in the fabric of strict constructionism.   
This Article defends this reading of the congressional record 
and the Court’s activism over the course of four parts.  Part I 
examines the constitutional arguments made in defense of and 
against the Act. Of necessity, this Part looks with particular care to 
the Senate hearings, a setting that proved far more critical of the 
proposed legislation.  Part II offers a short history of the Act and 
shows how Congress arrived at some of the critical language of the 
statute.  This Part concludes that Congress had an ambitious 
agenda in mind, yet remained mindful that taking its proposal too 
far would run into constitutional difficulties.   
Part III considers how these arguments fared in court and 
ultimately defends the Court and its broad readings of the statute.  
In this vein, this Part counsels against looking for evidence of 
legislative intent prior to the enactment of the relevant provisions.  
After all, Congress intended to go as far as the Court would allow 
it to go.  Instead of looking for evidence of intent in the legislative 
history as traditionally understood, it stands to reason that 
congressional hearings coming on the heels of a judicial 
interpretation of the Act would offer a much better guide to the 
intent of Congress.  This is a recurring theme in many of the 
congressional debates over extension of the Act, as Congress 
subsequently approves of – and even comes to expect – many of 
the broad readings of the provisions under review.  In this vein, it 
is telling that Congress has seen fit to correct a judicial 
interpretation of the Act in only a few select instances.   
 
17 See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976); Reno v. Bossier 
Parrish School Board, 528 U.S. 320 (2000). 
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This Article concludes that the Supreme Court has played a 
unique role in this field.  When interpreting the Voting Rights Act, 
Congress has wished for the Court to act assertively while offering 
broad readings of the relevant statutory language.   But the Court 
has not always been a faithful interpreter of congressional intent 
broadly understood.  In closing, Part IV examines the ebbs and 
flows of judicial review, and particularly the Court’s seemingly 
inconsistent approach to interpreting the statute.  More 
specifically, this Part contends that the Court behaves as we would 
expect it to behave, as a national policy-maker closely attuned to 
larger political trends.  These perceived shifts are nothing more 
than reflections on a Court whose behavior is seldom out of step 
for long with trends in public opinion.  Before concluding, this 
Part also examines some of the implications of this view, in 
particular reference to the looming reauthorization of the Act in 
2007. 
I. The Constitution in Congress: 1965 
This first Part examines the constitutional debate surrounding 
the proposed voting rights bill.  In particular, it highlights the 
momentousness of this occasion and the degree to which the bill 
pushed awfully hard at myriad constitutional norms.  The 
Constitution was in the minds of all the participants, many of 
whom never tired to cite past Supreme Court opinions in support 
of their positions.  The sponsors of the bill were no different in 
this regard.  As for the critics of the proposed legislation, they 
waged perhaps their strongest battle on the constitutionality of 
the bill.  This was a constant theme in both the House and Senate 
hearings.   
The Attorney General stated early in the hearings the 
administration’s view that the proposed bill was a constitutional 
means of enforcing the commands of the 15th Amendment.  In 
particular, he contended that the bill set up working categories 
under which it classified the states in accordance to the triggering 
formula, and “[g]iven a factual premise – as we have here – it is 
for Congress to set the boundaries.  That is essentially a legislative 
function which the courts do not and cannot quibble about.”18 
This was a basic question of constitutional authority, which he 
argued the 15th Amendment conferred upon Congress.  This 
 
18 1965 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 14. 
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argument relied in part on recent judicial decisions,19 a point that 
some critics of the legislation grudgingly conceded.20 
In response, critics of the administration bill argued that the 
proposed legislation would “destroy” the Constitution21 and would 
require “throwing the Constitution of your country out the 
window.”22 These arguments took many forms.  One leading 
criticism of the bill contended that the Act was beyond the powers 
of Congress under section 2 of the fifteenth amendment.23 A 
second criticism contended that the legislation was both a bill of 
attainder and an ex post fact law, in violation of Article I, section 
9.24 The Attorney General disagreed with both criticisms; on the 
 
19 See, e.g., id. at 112 (“Congressman, an awful lot of our constitutional 
arguments were made, as I am sure you recall, with respect to the 1964 act.  I 
think they were sincerely made and we were able to persuade nine justices of the 
Supreme Court as to our position and the constitutionality of that bill.”); see also 
id. at 385 (“I do not even consider this a close question because I think the 
people talking about it do not reckon with the fact that the Supreme Court has 
never in recent history questioned Congress judgment in this area.”) (testimony 
of Joseph Rauh, counsel for the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights). 
20 Id. at 626 (“Possibly in these days it is vain to advance constitutional 
questions, in view of the fact that the Supreme Court has assumed the power to 
amend the Constitution by judicial decree, and the executive is here demanding 
that Congress amend it by legislative act, wholly ignoring the plain provisions of 
the Constitution.”) (statement of Representative Dowdy). 
21 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 77 (statement of Senator Ervin). 
22 Id. at 155 (Statement of Senator Eastland); see id. at 57 (making a 
constitutional argument against the bill while disagreeing with a recent Supreme 
Court case) (Senator Ervin); id. at 548 (“You are violating the Constitution and 
your sworn duty to uphold the Constitution, and the provisions are too plain and 
too clear.  Nobody is dumb enough not to understand that.”) (statement of Judge 
L. H. Perez, representing Governor John J. McKeithen of Louisiana); id. at 615 
(arguing that the bill is unconstitutional) (statement of Paul Rodgers, Jr., 
Assistant Attorney General of Georgia).  To be fair, supporters of the legislation 
also worried abut the constitutionality of the bill.  See, e.g., id. at 140 (asking the 
Attorney General about the constitutionality of the bill and the Solicitor 
General’s views) (statement of Senator Hart). 
23 See, e.g., id. at 59, 60, 63. 
24 For example, Senator Ervin defined an ex post facto law as a law that 
“imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time of 
commitment or imposes additional punishment to that prescribed or changes the 
rule of evidence by which less or different testimony is sufficient to convict tan 
was then required.”  Id. at 63.  Under this definition, the proposed bill is an ex 
post facto law, since “a State or political subdivision was not subjected to the 
punishment of being deprived of their power to prescribe and administer literacy 
tests by the fact that less than 50 percent of their people of voting age failed to 
vote in the presidential election of 1964.” Id. He similarly complained that the 
legislation amounted to a bill of attainder.  See, e.g., id. at 64-5: 
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first, he argued that “where the Congress is given an express 
power to implement a provision of the Constitution it may adopt 
any reasonable and appropriate means for doing so.”25 He also 
disagreed that this was either a bill of attainder or an ex post facto 
law, as the bill “is not a punishment.”26 
The critics also took the banner of states’ rights and 
complained that “[y]ou would just as well wipe out your State 
lines if this theory of legislation is held constitutional,”27 Behind 
these general assertions of unconstitutionality sprinkled 
throughout the hearings, two basic grounds of disagreement 
emerged.  One argument focused on the rights of states to set their 
voters’ qualifications,28 a position considerably strengthened by 
the Court’s holding in Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board.29 
The Attorney General responded to this argument as follows: 
The constitutional rule is clear: So long as State 
laws or practices erecting voting qualifications for 
non-Federal elections do not run afoul of the 14th of 
15th Amendments, they stand undisturbed.  But 
when State power is abused – as it is plainly in the 
 
Despite my respect for your opinion, I think this bill 
constitutes a bill of attainder as it deprives the States, certain 
States and certain counties of certain States which are defined 
in terms by the act itself, and election officials in those States, 
and counties, of certain powers vested in the States and 
political subdivisions of the States.  It does this without a 
judicial trial, and furthermore, it does this on the basis of a fact 
completed in the past. 
25 Id. at 88; see id. at 674 (statement of Thomas Watkins). 
26 Id. at 63. 
27 Id. at 293 (Statement of Attorney Bloch); see id. at 309 (branding the 
Act a “conspiracy to destroy our State laws for voter qualifications”) (statement 
of Judge Perez). 
28 See id. at 112 (“I am convinced that there is a serious question of States’ 
rights or National rights.”) (testimony of Representative Ashmore); id. at 601 
(“you are infringing upon and usurping States rights when you impose Federal 
determination of voting qualifications under the 15th Amendment.”) (testimony 
of Daniel McLeod, Attorney General of South Carolina); id. at 755 (contending 
that the legislation is beyond constitutional authority, as the states have the right 
to set voter qualifications) (testimony of Representative Whitener). 
29 360 U.S. 45 (1959).  In Lassiter, the Court held that a state may impose 
literacy tests as voting qualifications so long as it does not apply them in 
discriminatory fashion.  See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 113 (arguing 
that the bill is forcing the states to do something that the Court said they do not 
have to do) (testimony of Representative Ashmore). 
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areas affected by the present bill – there is no 
magic in the words “voting qualifications.”30 
Put another way, the states’ right to set their voting qualifications 
was not absolute; it went only as far as the commands of the 14th
and 15th Amendment began. A state may not violate these 
commands under the guise of erecting “voting qualifications.” 
A related argument focused on the inevitable over-inclusive 
nature of the trigger formula.  During a prolonged exchange with 
the Attorney General, for example, Representative Cramer 
argued: “What constitutional basis is there for that where the 
effect is obviously to strike down the States’ constitutional rights 
to fix voter qualifications in areas where no discrimination has 
been found to exist?”31 This point had a great deal of force.  Recall 
that under the trigger provision of the bill, a state or political 
subdivision would come under the purview of the Act if it made 
use of a literacy test and less than fifty-percent of its voters were 
registered on November 1, 1964, or its voter turnout dipped under 
fifty-percent for the 1964 Presidential election. Of necessity, this 
would mean that some jurisdictions that were free of 
discrimination would come under the provisions of the bill.  And 
yet, if the 15th Amendment proscribes racial discrimination in 
voting, and Congress is seeking to enforce this amendment by 
appropriate legislation, how could Congress designate as covered 
jurisdictions areas with no proven instances of such 
discrimination?   
To the Attorney General, however, these areas of no 
discrimination within a larger discriminatory jurisdiction are 
exceptions, and “cannot be used as a proper support for saying . . . 
you can’t regulate other units within the State or the State as a 
whole.”32 After all, he argued elsewhere, “the fact that you are not 
cutting with absolute surgical skill and may pick up some other 
area is not of vital importance and is constitutionally irrelevant.”33 
On this point, he felt so confident about the administration’s 
course of action and the constitutionality of the bill that he did not 
“even see a constitutional difficulty.”34 So long as Congress acted 
reasonably, the legislation would bear scrutiny. 
 
30 Id. 15. 
31 Id. at 88. 
32 Id.
33 Id. at 82. 
34 Id. at 88. 
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II. Shooting for the Stars and Settling on the Particulars 
A. Advocacy and Stargazing 
This last point, whether Congress acted reasonably, applied 
not only to the particular provisions of the 1965 Act, but also to 
the perceived need for a voting rights bill coming on the heels of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The Attorney General confronted this 
issue often.  In the words of Representative Kastenmeier, for 
example, “this committee and the Congress ought to be especially 
sensitive in passing a bill this year, not merely because of the 
obvious demand and need for it, but because we passed a bill in 
1957, 1960, and in 1963-64.”35 The Attorney General answered 
that those prior efforts relied on the good faith of the states and 
local jurisdictions in enforcing the provisions of the law.  The new 
Act, in contrast, would “no longer rely on good faith. . . . [W]e are 
not going to be frustrated again by the long and tedious delays 
and resort to law as a delaying device.”36 In other words, the 
administration was no longer willing to make use of traditional 
modes of adjudication.  In light of earlier failures, a stronger yet 
more efficient approach was warranted. 
Yet, to its credit, the administration also sent a clear message 
from the beginning of the hearings that the proposed bill went as 
far as the administration thought that any legislation could go in 
light of relevant constitutional proscriptions.  “I have indicated 
repeatedly,” the Attorney General conceded, “I am entirely 
sympathetic with doing so if we can find a constitutional means 
and a practical means of doing so.  I confess that my ingenuity has 
floored in that regard.”37 And in response to a query from Senator 
Tydings, the Attorney General similarly explained: “[W]e were 
unable to draft a law where we could have the same objective 
criteria which we felt would stand up constitutionally and still 
cope with this kind of situation. . . . It wasn’t done from a desire to 
 
35 Id. at 66; see id. at 112 (Representative Ashmore); see also 1965 Senate 
Hearings, supra note 7, at 105-08 (Senator Ervin); id. at 155 (Senator Eastland); 
id. at 668 (“I respectfully remind the committee that the bill was offered only 8 
months after passage of title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . . This, I submit 
respectfully, is much too short a time within which to determine whether this 
recently passed legislation is adequate.”) (statement of Thomas Watkins). 
36 1965 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 67. 
37 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 183. 
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permit any discrimination in voting, but merely because we 
couldn’t devise a better law than this to deal with it.”38 
For this reason, Attorney General Katzenbach seemed willing 
at various times to let others try their hand at the problem.  For 
example, in response to Representative Rodino’s question 
whether he “believe[d] that this bill, with the provisions that have 
been written into it, [was] the surest way of guaranteeing that the 
right to vote will not be denied to any citizen regardless of race or 
color?,”39 Katzenback responded: “If this committee can come up 
with a better way of doing it and a surer way of doing it, I am sure 
the administration would support that way of doing it.  This is the 
best we have been able to accomplish.”40 Similarly, in response to 
Representative Cramer’s contention about the inadequacy of the 
legislation’s coverage, and particularly his question whether 
Katzenbach “would not object to any member of this committee 
making an exploration in that area,” the Attorney General 
explained: “Anything that will be in this direction and make it 
constitutional, I am all for it.”41 He repeated this sentiment 
throughout his testimony in both hearings.42 This willingness to 
consider different avenues of reform extended to the particular 
language of the statute.43 
38 Id. at 143; see Id. at 148 (explaining in response to a suggested change in the 
language of the statute that “I have reservations that that would be sound 
constitutionally” ). 
39 Id. at 49. 
40 Id.
41 Id. at 70.  Moments later, Cramer repeated his point that the legislation 
failed to offer sufficient coverage to areas in need.  “As the President said in his 
message, with which I agree, that discrimination in every community in America, 
wherever it exists, must be stamped out relating to voting.  The bill does not do 
it.”  Id. at 79.  In response, the Attorney General repeated his position. “Most 
respectfully, Congressman, I believe the bill does it as well as we have been able 
to devise a system for doing it.  Now, if there are better ways of doing it, as I said 
before, I would certainly be strongly in support of those.”  Id.; see id. at 146 (“But 
it wasn’t drafted to exclude any areas where discrimination was practiced, it was 
just that we lacked the skill and ingenuity to find a formula that would 
accomplish that result.  If the Senator has one, I would be happy to hear it.”). 
42 See, e.g., id. at 90 (“If the Congressman can suggest an effective means 
that covers everything that is covered by this act and can cover other areas and 
still be constitutional, I am sure that the administration would be most happy to 
consider that.  We don’t want discrimination anywhere.”). 
43 See, e.g., id. at 58 (“The intention, Mr. Chairman, is what I stated.  
Perhaps the Committee will want to clarify the language.”) (Burke Marshall); id.
at 63 (“If you can suggest, sir, language that makes it crystal clear what 
intimidation is, I would think that would represent a substantial improvement in 
the bill.”) (Katzenbach); Id. at 85 (“Perhaps there is a better way of doing it, 
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Many members of Congress and prominent witnesses who 
spoke in support of the bill got the message.   The House hearings 
figure prominently on this score, as they offered a rather amicable 
forum where the proposed bill received a warm and receptive 
welcome.  This is a setting where the relevant actors could focus 
on the goal at hand and how best to accomplish it.  During his 
testimony on March 24th, for example, Roy Wilkins, executive 
director of the NAACP, remarked: “All we want is that nothing 
shall be considered good enough until it has reached the limit of 
constitutional interpretation and of practical and pragmatic 
possibility that you mention.”44 Representative Lindsay similarly 
asked a few days earlier: “with this mood in the country and the 
willingness of the members to get through a voting rights bill, and 
I think it will be a large majority, too, by which it would go 
through, can’t we try to do a little bit more?”45 But Chairman 
Celler put it best, on the last day of the hearings and in reference 
to Joseph Rauh, Jr., counsel for the Leadership Conference on 
Civil Rights: “I have great respect for Mr. Rauh, but sometimes he 
is a stargazer, and that is a creditable term.  But we must be 
practical.”46 Congress could only go so far. 
 
Senator, but I am sure if we are in agreement as to what it is intended to say that 
with all of your skill we can find a way of saying that which satisfies you.”). 
44 1965 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 403. 
45 Id. at 109. 
46 Id. at 693.  To which Mr. Rauh responded: “I admire you both 
(Congressmen Celler and Rogers) but representing the amalgamated stargazers I 
have something I would like to present to you.”  Id. at 694. 
Chairman Celler repeated this admonition often.  For example, and in 
response to a request by James Farmer, National Director of CORE, for an 
expansion of the reach of the bill, he explained: 
No bill may go far enough but you must consider that if you 
weight this bill down with too much, you may get into serious 
difficulty, and you may not get anything. 
You must remember that we must be pragmatic here in this 
committee, we must be very careful that we do not incur too 
many hostile votes on this bill. That must be remembered also 
by the general public as well as organizations like your own 
and we labor under considerable difficulties in that regard. 
Id. at 686. 
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B. Tinkering with the Details: Procedures and Political 
Subdivisions 
The message throughout the hearings was clear: Congress 
must go as far as politically and constitutionally possible.  With 
this goal in mind, both houses of Congress kept tinkering with the 
language of the statute and the reach of its many provisions.  The 
remaining of this Part discusses two particular provisions.  First, 
many members of Congress pressed the Attorney General for 
clearer statutory guidance on the definition of the term “political 
subdivision.”  This was an important definition, for the reach of 
the original trigger provision under section 3 (a) of the bill,47 as 
well as the preclearance provision under the original section 8,48 
extended to both states and “political subdivisions.”  During the 
House hearings, Representative McCulloch defined the phrase as 
“any school district, borough, township, county, or any other 
political subdivision within the meaning of the State law.”49 In 
response, the Attorney General narrowed the definition; “we are 
aiming at voter registration,” he explained, “and I think the term 
‘political subdivision’ is used here aimed primarily at the area in 
which the registration process takes place.”50 He then suggested 
that “[t]hat may be a point which should be clarified.”51 
Senator Ervin raised a similar query during the Senate 
hearings, and the Attorney General repeated his view that “we are 
talking about the area in which people are registered, the 
appropriate unit for registering.”52 In his view, “we are talking 
about no area smaller than a county or parish.”53 Yet on the 
language of the statute as then drafted, its reach seemed 
considerable; in North Carolina, for example, “every municipality 
is a political subdivision of the State, even every sanitary district is 
a subdivision of the State.”54 Hence, Senator Ervin deemed 
necessary to amend the bill, and the Attorney General concurred.  
“I think that might be done to define political subdivision here in 
the bill in that way.  That is what I intended.”55 
47 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, S. 1564, 89th Cong. § 3 (a) (1965). 
48 See id. at § 8. 
49 1965 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 51. 
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 44. 
53 Id.
54 Id. (Senator Ervin). 
55 Id.
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In the end, both the Senate and House committees responded 
to these concerns during their executive sessions.  The House bill 
included in section 14 (c)(2) the following definition: “The term 
political subdivision shall mean any county or parish, except that 
where registration for voting is not conducted under the 
supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any other 
subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting.”56 
The Senate bill offered a substantially similar definition.57
Second, the original language of section 2 read as follows: 
“No voting qualification or procedure shall be imposed or applied 
to deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race or color.”58
Senator Fong expressed concern that the bill did not define the 
word “procedure,” and he was “afraid that there may be certain 
practices that you may not be able to include in the word 
‘procedure.’”59 The Attorney General understood the term 
broadly, yet Senator Fong asked him whether, “[t]he way is now 
written, do you think there may be a possibility that the Court 
would hassle over the word ‘procedure’?”60 The Attorney General 
did not think so, yet allowed that language in the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 used the terms “standards, practices, or procedures,” and 
“[p]erhaps that would be broader than simply the word procedure 
and perhaps the committee might consider making that point 
clear.”61 
To be sure, and in response to a further question by the 
Senator, the Attorney General indicated that he was not opposed 
to expanding the word, as “it was intended to be all-inclusive of 
any kind of practice.”62 Senator Fong pressed on, and contrasted 
the way in which section 3(a) defined the terms “test or device” in 
some detail; “[b]ut you have not spelled out the word ‘procedure.  
I think that the word ‘procedure’ should be spelled out a little bit 
more.”63 The Attorney General agreed,64 and both the House and 
 
56 To Enforce the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States: Unpublished Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before the House Comm. on Rules,
89th Cong. 28 (1965) [hereinafter House Unpublished Hearings]. 
57 To Enforce the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States: Executive Session on S.R. 1564 Before the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 5 (1965) [hereinafter Senate Executive Session]. 
58 Voting Rights Act of 1965, S. 1564, 89th Cong. § 2 (1965). 
59 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 191. 
60 Id.
61 Id. at 191-92. 
62 Id. at 192. 
63 Id.
64 Id. (“I think that is a good suggestion, Senator.”). 
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the Senate committees ultimately concurred as well.  Under the 
amended section 2 of the bill, “No voting qualification or 
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be 
imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or 
abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on 
account of race or color.”65
The lessons of this Part should be clear.  As Senator Dirksen 
remarked on April 6, while the Senate committee met in executive 
session: “So I must say that a tremendous amount of work has 
gone into this proposal.”66 The draft of the bill then under 
consideration was at least the fifth version of the bill, and “[t]he 
reason for it,” he explained, was that “as these suggestions came 
in on the course of the hearings, they had to evaluate them and 
see whether they should be seriously considered.”67 Congress was 
listening, and taking the voting rights bill and its provisions as far 
as possible, mindful of existing constitutional and political limits.  
The political limits were few, as Representative Lindsay 
underscored, for the bill had the support of substantial 
congressional majorities.  As for the constitutional limits and the 
Attorney General’s optimism, a legal challenge loomed in the 
horizon.  The critics would not give up easily. 
C. The Collaborative Approach 
From these realities as Congress understood them, the 
solution was brilliant in its simplicity.  Note first that Congress 
knew the extent of the problem and how difficult was to tailor an 
effective solution, as seen by its previous efforts in 1957, 1960, and 
1964.  Note also that as far as Congress was concerned, this was 
not a question of unavailability of power, for Congress was 
confident that it had the power under the 15th Amendment to do 
something about this problem.  So the real question for Congress 
was, how far could the substantive provisions of the bill go? 
In response, the administration offered a statute whose 
language remained broad in scope.  Such broad language, coupled 
with a clear intent to push the statute as far as constitutionally 
permissible, offered the Supreme Court a conduit through which it 
may carry out the intent of Congress and the administration.  And 
this intent was unmistakable: to fight the blight of racial 
 
65 House Unpublished Hearings, supra note 56, at 11; see Senate 
Executive Session, supra note 57, at 4. 
66 Id. at 3. 
67 Id.
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discrimination and “to open the city of hope to all people of all 
races.”68 Hence, the Court may do its traditional job of statutory 
interpretation under unique circumstances, for it may legitimately 
interpret section 5 – and the Voting Rights Act in general – 
expansively, up to the limits of constitutional interpretation as the 
Court itself understood them. 
This strategy might appear risky, to be sure, for it hinged on 
the Court and its willingness to go along.  Yet this was the same 
Court whose members stood and clapped during Johnson’s 
address, a fact hardly lost on critics of the bill.  As James 
Kilpatrick, vice-chairman of the Virginia Commission on 
Constitutional Government and one of the more thoughtful critics 
of the bill, complained, “it is . . . unfortunate that member of the 
Supreme Court of the United States appeared – turned up to here 
[sic] the President’s message and appeared on the television 
cameras applauding.  I think this is a violation of the separation of 
powers of the United States and creates imbalances.”69 Former 
Representative Albert Watson similarly concluded: “Where else 
can we turn?  We see the Supreme Court sitting on the House floor 
wildly applauding legislative recommendations.  Can we expect 
impartial examination of these proposals by that body if they 
become law?”70 Congress thus had a very good inkling that the 
Court would go along.  The Court could be trusted to do its part in 
this important project.  
Consider, for example, section 5 of the Act, its preclearance 
provision.  On its terms, a covered “state or political subdivision” 
covered under section 4(b) of the Act must preclear any new 
“voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, 
practice, or procedure with respect to voting.” In turn, the 
Attorney General and/or the District Court must ensure that 
“such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure 
does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying 
or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.”71 
The reasons for this provision were obvious.  According to the 
Attorney General,  
absent a provision of this kind, you leave it upon a 
State to devise, if it can, some new method of 
 
68 Lyndon B. Johnson, We Shall Overcome, in SPEECHES OF THE AMERICAN 
PRESIDENTS 637, 641 (Janet Podell and Steven Anzovin eds., 1988). 
69 1965 Senate hearings, supra note 7, at 642. 
70 1965 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 623. 
71 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2004). 
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preventing people from voting on grounds of race, 
and then go through the painfully long litigation 
process. . . . This is an attempt to prevent new laws 
which would frustrate the objectives of Congress 
here.72 
More specifically, he argued elsewhere, “the effort here was to get 
at things that were not included within the words ‘tests and 
devices.’  And the thought that other things that violated the 15th 
Amendment by a State should also be subjected to judicial 
review.”73 This was thus an effort to extend the substantive 
coverage of the Act in ways that neither Congress nor the 
administration could foresee in 1965.   
In order for the preclearance provision to perform this 
function, its language must remain broad and flexible.  And the 
text of section 5 was clearly that, to the chagrin of some critics 
who complained that the language was too broad.74 The 
implications of this choice were clear.  Do not limit the language 
of the statute and concomitantly trust the Court to play an 
important part in extending the provisions of the statute as 
necessary, and “to the limits of constitutional interpretation.”75 
72 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 172; see id. at 237: 
It occurred to us that there are other ways in which States can 
discriminate, and we have had experience with State legislative 
efforts in other areas, for example, limiting the registrars to 
very short periods of time, or the imposition of either very high 
poll taxes or property taxes which would have the effect of 
denying or abridging rights guaranteed under the 15th 
Amendment, that kind of law should be covered, too. 
See also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 335 (1966) (“Congress 
knew that some of the States covered by § 4(b) of the Act had resorted to the 
extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various kind for the sole 
purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal 
decrees.”). 
73 Id. at 237; see id.: “The effort is to prevent this constant slowing down 
process which occurs when States enact new laws that may clearly be in violation 
of the 15th Amendment, but you have to go through the process of getting judicial 
determinations of that.  It takes a long time.  In the interval the purposes of the 
act are frustrated.” 
74 See id. at 622 (“Well, now, procedures for voting, that is an extremely 
broad term. . . . We certainly think that legislation should modify procedures in 
order to limit the scope.  That is all this act is concerned with, anyway, so the 
language is way too broad.”) (Rogers). 
75 1965 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 403 (remarks of Roy Wilkins). 
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far as the Constitution allows. In other words, enlist the 
Court as a partner in carrying out these important goals.   
III. The Act in Court: A Voting Rights Colloquy  
Almost as soon as the President signed the bill into law on 
August 6th, 1965, critics of the bill sought a judicial ruling on its 
constitutionality.  And within a year, the Court issued its 
landmark decisions of South Carolina v. Katzenbach and 
Katzenbach v. Morgan. Both cases sided with the government 
while sanctioning a very strong assertion of federal power.  This 
Part examines the life of the Act in court.  It concludes that the 
Court has dominated the debate over the substance of the Act and 
Congress has willingly acquiesced, with some notable exceptions.  
In turn, this dominance has meant that the substance of the Act 
has fluctuated with the moods of the Court; while the Court often 
interpreted the Act broadly and liberally, it has also done so in 
narrow fashion. 
A. Mr. Katzenbach Goes to Washington: The Look of a 
Dahlian Court 
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,76 the Court acknowledged 
that the Act established “stringent new remedies,”77 and some of 
its provisions were “inventive”78 and “uncommon.”79 Yet the 
Court recognized that “exceptional conditions can justify 
legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.”80 And further, 
Congress was not acting rashly and hastily but, rather, it “explored 
with great care the problem of racial discrimination in voting.”81 
76 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
77 Id. at 308. 
78 Id. at 327. 
79 Id. at 334. 
80 Id.
81 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).  The critics disagreed with this point, to be 
sure, and vehemently so.  See 1965 Senate Hearing, supra note 7, at 54 
(“Congress has rarely been called upon to enact a law which bears on its face the 
marks of having been written in such haste as this one.”) (Senator Ervin); id. at 
616 (“The bill was rather hazily drawn and I think it is obvious”) (Rodgers); see 
also 1965 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 623 (“All of us know, Mr. Chairman, 
that the support of this measure is primarily the result of mass hysteria created 
and nurtured by the national press.”) (statement of former Representative 
Watson).  While Senator Ervin repeated this complaint often, see id. at 54, 235, 
593, the Attorney General denied it.  See id. at 54 (“It wasn’t written in all that 
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Thus on the record before it, the Court concluded that the means 
used by Congress were a legitimate, permissible response to the 
problem at hand.82 “After enduring nearly a century of systematic 
resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment,” the Court explained in a 
moment of great candor, “Congress might well decide to shift the 
advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to 
its victims.”83 Deference to Congress was the order of the day. 
Similarly, in Morgan v. Katzenbach,84 the Court upheld 
Section 4 (e) of the Act, which provided that no person who has 
completed a sixth grade education in a school accredited by the 
commonwealth of Puerto Rico shall be denied the right to vote on 
account of an inability to read or write English.  This provision ran 
into direct conflict with the recent precedent established by 
Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board,85 a case decided a scant 
6 years earlier, where the Court turned down a facial challenge to 
literacy tests.  The Court in Morgan left this holding undisturbed, 
explaining that the question was not whether application of the 
literacy requirement violated the equal protection clause.  Rather, 
the question in Morgan was whether section 4 (e) was 
“appropriate legislation to enforce the fifteenth amendment.”86
The Court unsurprisingly concluded that it was, while asserting in 
a controversial footnote that “Congress’ power under § 5 is limited 
to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the 
Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, 
or dilute these guarantees.”87 As in South Carolina, the Court was 
deferential to a fault, explaining that “[i]t is enough that we be 
able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve 
the conflict as it did.”88 Testifying in front of the Senate during 
the 1969 hearings, former Solicitor General Cox referred to 
Morgan as “a token of congressional supremacy.”89 
One initial impression from these early cases is quite cynical; 
to wit, what could we possibly expect the Court to do instead?  
 
haste.  There were a lot of revisions that were made, as I think is true of almost 
every law that is enacted, that there are changes made in committee, changes 
made up to the last minute.  Just because changes are made, just before the bill is 
reported, you don’t say that the bill was drafted in haste.”). 
82 South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 328, 334. 
83 Id. at 328 (italics added). 
84 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
85 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
86 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966). 
87 Id. at 651 n.10. 
88 Id. at 653. 
89 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 334. 
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While in the midst of the civil rights movement, the Court stepped 
aside and let the revolution in its midst run its course, and in so 
doing it became a partner in the making of civil rights law.  
According to Lucas Powe, for example,  
The Court was extending an offer to Congress to 
become a full partner in the Court’s great tasks, 
just as Congress had become with the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  In 
making the offer the Court saw that its views and 
those of Congress were harmonious.  Each was 
working as hard as it could to improve American 
life.90
This is an important point.  I cannot underscore enough how 
strongly the critics felt about the unconstitutionality of the bill.  To 
some, it was “based on emotionalism and is shot through with 
weaknesses which I do not believe the Supreme Court could 
possibly uphold;”91 and others, while professing a “strong enough 
faith in the intellectual honesty of the members of that Court . . . 
would not believe they would for 1 minute permit this 
unconstitutional act to be upheld.”92 In making these claims, they 
were asking the Court to side against the policy views of a very 
strong national majority.  Yet this is something the Court seldom 
does.   
Robert Dahl early work is instructive on this point.  As he 
concluded, “the policy views dominant on the Court are never for 
long out of line with the policy views dominant among the law 
making majorities of the United States.”93 Or, put in terms more 
relevant to the voting rights decisions, the Court is, “[b]y itself . . . 
 
90 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 265 
(2000). 
91 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 629 (“I think this bill is) 
(Senator Sparkman). 
92 Id. at 678 (Watkins). 
93 Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court 
as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957), reprinted in 50 EMORY 
L.J. 563 (2001); see GLENDON SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL POLICY-MAKING: THE POLITICAL 
ROLE OF COURTS 13 (rev. ed. 1974) ("[T]he federal courts have always (and 
correctly) been perceived by party leaders as a major instrument for exercising 
control over the substantive content of public policy."); MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND 
POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT: NEW APPROACHES TO POLITICAL JURISPRUDENCE 
(1964).. 
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almost powerless to affect the course of national policy.”94 This is 
not to say that the Court plays no role at all, for it does; as Dahl 
explained, “at its best[,] the Court operates to confer legitimacy, 
not simply on the particular and parochial policies of the 
dominant political alliance, but upon the basic patterns of 
behavior required for the operation of a democracy.”95 It is telling 
that Dahl wrote this essay almost a decade before the great civil 
rights cases of the 1960’s, for these cases epitomize his view of the 
Court.  After Morgan and South Carolina, not only were Congress 
and the Attorney General vindicated, but far more importantly, 
the debate shifted ground in telling and quite important ways.   
B. The Court Takes Charge: Interpreting Section 5 
Once the Court issued its definitive rulings on the 
constitutionality of the Act, the debate shifted in notable ways.  To 
 
94 Dahl, supra note 93, at 295; see LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 
271-72 (5th ed. 1995) (arguing that, while the Court has considerable 
constitutional and political strength, its policymaking role is a limited one); 
Thomas R. Marshall, Policymaking and the Modern Court: When Do Supreme 
Court Rulings Prevail? 42 POL. RES. Q. 493, 503 (1989) (clarifying "the modern 
Supreme Court's limits as a policy-maker within the context of American 
politics").  
This point provoked a long and persuasive response from Jonathan Casper.  
Jonathan Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 50 (1976).  According to Casper, the Court is a much more influential 
policy making player than Dahl suggests.  According to Dahl, for example, 
“[a]cting solely by itself with no support from the President and Congress, the 
Court is almost powerless to affect the Court of national policy.”  Dahl, supra, at 
293.  For Dahl, winners are influential, losers are not.  Yet, Casper argues, this 
measure of “influence” is inaccurate at best.  Simply because the laissez faire 
policies of the Lochner court were eventually discarded, one cannot say that the 
Court was not influential.  As he states, “[t]he notion of a ‘winning’ and a ‘losing’ 
policy when institutions clash imposes an artificial distinction that obscures a 
dynamic process in which even the ‘losers’ contribute importantly to outcomes 
that eventually emerge.”  Casper, supra, at 62. Under Dahl’s framing, “no 
institution is really capable of the decisive role he argues.”  See id. at 61.  In the 
end, Casper’s argument agrees with Dahl’s overarching conclusion that the Court 
is a policy-making institution.  Their disagreement stems mainly over the 
question of influence. 
95 Dahl, supra note 93, at 295.  This claim of judicial legitimacy has an 
impressive number of respected followers.  See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE 
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 29 (2nd 
ed. 1986) (acknowledging his reliance on Black’s “most suggestive and perceptive 
argument” that the Court plays a legitimizing role); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE 
PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY (1960); David Adamany, 
Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court, 1973 WISC. L. REV.
790 (1973). 
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be sure, some critics refused to accept the Court’s arguments.  
Prominent among these critics was Senator Sam Ervin, who by 
1969 had assumed the chairmanship of the Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Rights of the Judiciary Committee.  During the 
1969 hearings over amendments and extensions to the Act, for 
example, he remarked: “The Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional 
in every respect notwithstanding what the Supreme Court said.”96 
But by and large, this was a lost battle and a waste of energy, as 
the debate clearly shifted to the substantive provisions of the Act.  
And on this score, the Court clearly led the way. 
The first case was Allen v. State Board of Elections.97 In 
Allen, the Court examined section 5 of the Act and offered a broad 
and expansive reading of the Act.  As the Court explained, “[t]he 
Voting Rights Act was aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious, 
state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens the 
right to vote because of their race.”98 This clear intention, coupled 
with the “weight of the legislative history,”99 led the Court to 
conclude that Congress intended that “all changes, no matter how 
small, be subjected to sec. 5 scrutiny.”100 
Similarly, in Gaston County v. United States,101 the Court 
offered a similarly expansive interpretation of section 4(a) of the 
Act.  Under this section, a covered jurisdiction wishing to reinstate 
its suspended test or device must show that “no such test or device 
has been used during the five years preceding the filing of the 
action for the purposes or with the effect of denying or abridging 
the right to vote on account of race or color.”102 Gaston County 
wished to make such a showing in federal court.  But the District 
Court denied it relief, for it concluded that the County’s history of 
segregated and unequal education would mean that the literacy 
test would have the effect of discriminating against blacks.  While 
underscoring its view that this was not a per se rule, and in an 
opinion authored by Justice Harlan, the Supreme Court agreed.  
Under section 4(a) of the Act, in other words, a reviewing court 
may consider whether a literacy test would have the effect of 
 
96 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 175; see id. at 357 (“I don’t 
consider that Katzenbach v. Morgan is constitutional. . . . I also don’t think 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach is constitutional.”). 
97 393 U.S. 544 (1969). 
98 Id. at 565. 
99 Id. at 569. 
100 Id. at 568. 
101 395 U.S. 285 (1969). 
102 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 89th Cong. § 4(a) (1965). 
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denying the right to vote as a consequence of the jurisdiction’s 
history of segregated and inferior schools.103 
Critics and supporters alike agreed that these cases offered 
broad interpretations of the Act.104 Unsurprisingly, the critics 
went further, complaining that these decisions went beyond the 
intent of the Congress.  According to A. F. Summer, Mississippi’s 
Attorney General, the 1965 Congress “never imagin[ed] the 
lengths to which the courts would enlarge the application of the 
act to include within its purview any State or local enactments.”105 
Senator Ervin similarly complained that “[t]he Court has 
rewritten the Voting Rights Act and made meaningless the release 
provisions of section 4.”106 
At first blush, these criticisms appear right on target.  But the 
Voting Rights Act is not a traditional statute, and the role of the 
Court in this area has been nothing short of unorthodox.  
Consider, for example, the words of Representative McCulloch, 
offered during the 1969 hearings: 
Section 5 was intended to prevent the use of most 
of these devices.  But apparently the States rarely 
obeyed the mandate of that section, and the 
Federal Government was too timid in its 
enforcement, I hope that the case of Allen v. State 
 
103 See Gaston County, 395 U.S. at 293. 
104 See Voting Rights Act Extension: Hearings on H.R. 4249 and H.R. 5538 
Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 62 
(1969) [hereinafter 1969 House Hearings] (“The Department apparently took a 
somewhat narrow view of the scope of section 5.  Their position, however, was 
expanded in the Supreme Court, where they filed an amicus brief in the Allen 
case.  And the Supreme Court interpreted section 5 very broadly in the Allen 
case.” (Glickstein); Id. at 83 (“Most recently, the Supreme Court, in Allen v. State 
Board of Education, has arbitrarily ruled that States covered by the act cannot 
take any action, whatever the intent, which diminishes the effectiveness of Negro 
voting rights. This, again, has nothing to do with discrimination.”) (Jack 
McGann, Liberty Lobby) 
105 1969 House Hearings, supra note 104, at 130; see id. (“Several 
decisions, notably Allen v. State Board of Elections . . . have interpreted section 5 
in a manner which Congress could hardly have contemplated.”) (A. F. Summer); 
1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 369. 
106 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 5; The Enforcement of the 
Voting Rights Act: Hearings Before Civil Rts. Oversight Subcomm. of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong. 71 (1971) [hereinafter 1971 House Hearings]
(complaining that “in the Perkins case, I don’t think anyone, certainly not the 
Attorney General of the United States nor us, anticipated that the expansion of a 
city’s limits would be included under those things that had to be submitted under 
the act”) (A. F. Sumner). 
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Board of Elections, decided by the Supreme Court 
on March 3, 1969, is the portent of change.107 
Here was the House minority leader and a leading voice during 
the 1965 debates, exhorting the federal government to do more 
while looking to Allen for approval.  Clearly, the minority leader 
understood section 5 as a broad and necessary provision.108 Far 
more tellingly, he remarked that thanks to Allen, “at long last after 
4 years section 5 will become effective.”109 
Representative McCulloch was hardly alone.  Important in 
this regard is the way in which members of Congress referred to 
Allen and Gaston County during the 1969 hearings.  Aside from 
critics such as Senator Ervin, who pointed to these cases as 
further proof that the sunset provisions of the Act should be 
allowed to expire, supporters of the Act referred to these decisions 
as part and parcel of the new statutory regime.  More crucially, 
supporters of the Act made arguments and staked positions 
during the 1969 hearings that made use of Allen and Gaston 
County as both accepted and crucial components of the 
legislation.  And clearly, talk of overturning these decisions was 
also close to non-existent.  That Congress held scheduled hearings 
so close to these decisions yet chose not to overturn them speaks 
volumes about the way in which Congress understood and 
ultimately accepted these cases as consonant with the mission of 
the Act.110 
During the 1975 hearings, the debate over the Court’s 
expansive interpretations of the Act was both subdued and 
altogether different.  As in previous hearings, some witnesses 
 
107 Id. at 4. 
108 Id. at 270 (“Section 5 must not be repealed or emasculated.  The past 
four years have proved that there are hundreds of ways to discriminate.  Section 
4 deals with literacy tests or devices.  Section 5 deals with all of the rest.”). 
109 Id. at 271.  The Civil Rights Commission took a similar view.  A Staff 
memorandum dated July 8, 1969 argued that “until the Allen decision, referred 
to previously, it had been unclear whether Section 5 applied to all election law 
changes in the covered States, or only to those changes which dealt with voting 
and registration.” 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 52.  “Because the 
Court has now made clear that Section 5 has a very wide scope,” the memo 
continued, “States can now be expected to submit more statutes for approval.” 
Id.
110 See, in this vein, Justice Thomas’ intriguing concurrence in Holder.
See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 929 (1994) (conceding that Congress had 
interpreted section 5 expansively in Allen “and Congress has reenacted § 5 
subsequent to our decisions adopting that expansive interpretation”) (Thomas, 
J., concurring). 
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offered unqualified support for the Court and its interpretations of 
the Act.111 There were also criticisms, of course, but by this time 
the critics were far more focused and pointed in their choice of 
targets. They knew that fighting the Act or their judicial 
interpretations on the merits would prove hopeless.  They still 
criticized the Court, to be sure, but while doing so they also asked 
Congress for guidance and much-needed clarity in the field. This 
muddiness was a problem, argued Daniel McLeod, South 
Carolina’s Attorney General, because “it is very difficult and a very 
onerous burden with the uncertainties brought into the picture by 
reason of the application of the act to know which acts should be 
submitted.”112 In this vein, Stone Barefield, a state representative 
from Mississippi, similarly complained that the courts have 
interpreted the Act far beyond the intent of Congress and “so that 
I, as a legislator, and so that other legislators in the affected States 
will know, pleased [sic] write into the Voting Rights Act by 
definition what Congress intends to cover by standard practice 
and procedure.”113 
For my purposes, the most interesting and perhaps most 
important testimony was that of Representative David Satterfield, 
a fellow congressman from the commonwealth of Virginia.  He 
clearly took issue with the courts and their interpretations and 
applications of the statute.  Yet Congress was not powerless in the 
face of a runaway judicial system, he complained, for these were 
largely questions of statutory interpretation.  Thus, as he wrote: 
I consider it unfortunate that the act has been 
construed by the courts to mean what they say it 
means.  I believe it is time now for Congress, by 
specific amendments to make clear its position and 
its precise objectives, especially with regard to 
those court decisions which have interpreted the 
act.  There is an opportunity now, which should be 
 
111 Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings on H.R. 939, H.R. 2148, 
H.R. 3247 and H.R. 3501 Before Subcomm. on Civil and Const. Rights, 94th 
Cong. 641 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 House Hearings] (“The significance of section 
5 did not become apparent until 1969, when the Supreme Court in Allen v. State 
Board of Elections clearly stated that this section covers changes that dilute black 
citizens’ votes as well as simpler devices of disenfranchisement.”). (Armand 
Derfner); id. at 717 (“I do not want to leave the impression that the court, in the 
Allen case, enunciated something which the Congress did not intend.”) (Parker). 
112 Id. at 581. 
113 Id. at 707; see id. at 714 (“And that is why I have asked this committee 
to seriously consider defining these standards, the practices and procedures that 
we are dealing with.”). 
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seized, for Congress to make it clear whether it 
agrees with court interpretations and where it does 
not to make clear what it does mean to say by this 
act.  I hope this committee will render special 
attention to this opportunity.114 
Minutes later, he repeated his request: “Frankly, I have difficulty 
in finding in this act or the act’s legislative history the basis on 
which the courts are making that decision.  It would be my hope 
that this subcommittee will address that point.”115 To which 
Representative Don Edwards, the chair of the subcommittee, 
responded: “Well, we will address that point.”116 
But they didn’t.  Representative Satterfield issued his request 
on March 21, and the committee published its report 
approximately six weeks later, on May 8.117 And curiously, not a 
word was written on this issue.  Instead, the Report extended an 
approving nod towards the Court and its interpretations of the 
Act, as it cited both Allen and Perkins while explaining that 
around the time of the 1970 amendments to the Act, the Court 
“gave broad interpretations to the scope of Section 5.”118 It is clear 
that the House was fully aware of the Court’s broad 
interpretations of the statute yet uninterested in cabining them.  
So long as their views were in harmony, Congress need not pay 
careful attention to its craftsmanship of the Act.  So long, that is, 
as the Court was willing to do the heavy lifting. 
C. Shifting Ground and the Beauty of Counting to Five: 
Beer’s Turn, Georgia’s Twists and the Bossiers 
All too soon, however, the honeymoon came to an end.  With 
Beer v. United States,119 decided a year after the 1975 extension of 
the Act, the Court began an apparent retreat from its earlier, 
expansive interpretations of the Act.  And in subsequent years, the 
Court continued to display a penchant for interpreting the Act in 
 
114 Id. at 730; see id. at 737 (explaining that the crux of the matter for him 
was “whether or not the decisions of the courts, which to my mind have 
converted the objective of this act from one to guarantee that there not be a 
denial of the right to vote, and not to abridge the right to vote, to an enlargement 
to say that you can not dilute the effectiveness of that vote”). 
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-196 (1975). 
118 Id. at 9. 
119 425 U.S. 130 (1976). 
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narrow fashion.  This last section examines three such instances: 
Beer and Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board,120 which adhere to 
the script of narrow interpretations of the Act; and Georgia v. 
Ashcroft,121 a case that appears to turn away from this narrow 
approach, and in so doing brings the doctrine full circle, to the 
time of Allen and Gaston County.
1. Beer and the Standards of Preclearance 
The question at the heart of the Beer litigation appeared to be 
a relatively simple one: in applying section 5 of the Act, under 
what standard must the district court or the Attorney General 
assess whether a districting plan has the effect of denying or 
abridging the right to vote on racial grounds?  Upon inspection, 
however, this question proved to be anything but simple, perhaps 
unnecessarily so.  After all, as the District Court recognized in an 
opinion authored by Judge Spottswood Robinson III, “[t]he 
legislative history of he Act establishes the full and firm allegiance 
of its own objectives with the goals of the [Fifteenth] 
Amendment.”122 In using “parallel language,” Congress signaled 
its intention to enforce the dictates of the Fifteenth Amendment 
without resorting to the traditionally time-consuming judicial 
process. 
In other words, it stands to reason that Congress simply 
wished to shift the constitutional inquiry both temporally and 
institutionally, to the Attorney General or the District Court, 
before changes in the law took place, while also shifting the 
burden of proof and placing it on the states and political 
subdivisions.  The standard under section 5 review would thus be 
the same standard under the Fifteenth Amendment,123 with 
section 5 acting as a prophylactic.  The fact that Congress said 
precious little about the particular standard that would govern 
section 5 inquiries is telling, particularly since section 5 had 
 
120 520 U.S. 471 (1997); 528 U.S. 320 (2000). 
121 See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Georgia v. Ashcroft,  539 
U.S. 461 (2003). 
122 374 F. Supp. 363, 382 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
123 See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 148 (1976) (contending that “it 
is questionable whether the ‘purpose and effect’ language states anything more 
than the constitutional standard”) (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. (Explaining that 
section 5 cases “make clear” that the effects inquiry “is essentially the 
constitutional inquiry”). 
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become by 1975 the “centerpiece of the Act.”124 If the standard 
were anything other than what common sense would appear to 
dictate, surely Congress would have made its intentions far more 
explicit. 
The District Court in Beer understood its task under section 5 
along these lines.  To its credit, the district court conducted a 
nuanced and fact-intensive inquiry, which highlighted the clear 
and long-standing role played by race in the political and cultural 
life of New Orleans.125 The court then looked to the doctrinal 
structure provided by the Supreme Court’s reapportionment cases 
and analogized its “abridgment” inquiry under the Act to the 
Supreme Court’s vote dilution inquiry.126 In making this move, 
the court made clear that “the question before us is not whether 
New Orleans must confer upon its black citizens every political 
advantage that a redistricting plan conceivably could offer.”127 
Rather, plaintiffs must “press vigorously . . . for all that is their 
due, but . . . no more.”128 Or, as former Attorney General 
Katzenbach argued during the 1975 Senate hearings, “[w]hile 
blacks have made important gains, these gains do not reflect the 
political power of their numbers were there no discrimination.”129 
The inquiry was essentially an inquiry of unconstitutional 
vote dilution as commonly understood.  Such an inquiry demands 
a comparison between an optimal state of affairs and the 
challenged circumstances.  In this vein, the court explained that 
“the relevant comparison is between the results which the 
minority is constitutionally free to command and the results 
which the plan leaves the minority able to achieve.”130 Put 
another way, the comparison was between theoretical results free 
of any dilutive influence and the actual results under the 
challenged districting plan.  On the facts, the court concluded that 
the districting plan would unjustifiably dilute the black vote in 
New Orleans.  And “[s]urely the Fifteenth Amendment . . . 
 
124 1975 House Hearings, supra note 111, at 40 (testimony of Hon. Arthur 
Fleming, Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights). 
125 See Beer, 374 F. Supp. at 374-75. 
126 See id. at 383. 
127 Id. at 389. 
128 Id. at 390. 
129 Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on S. 407, S. 903, 
S. 1297, S. 1409, and S. 1443 Before Subcomm. on Const. Rights of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 125 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Senate 
Hearings]
130 Beer, 374 F. Supp. at 388. 
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discountenances the abridgment evident in this case.”131 Under 
the factors of Zimmer v. McKeithen132 and recent vote dilution 
case law,133 the court further concluded that the plan would 
unjustifiably dilute the potential black voting strength in the 
city.134 Finally, the court also concluded that the city had not 
justified its use of tw0 at-large seats. 
In an opinion authored by Justice Stewart, the U.S. Supreme 
Court reversed.135 Over a scant nine-page opinion, the Court 
managed to turn what could be a difficult issue – if the lower court 
opinion is any indication – into a simplistic one.  The question 
was the same: when does a districting plan have “the effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or 
color”?  The Court began its analysis by pointing out that this 
inquiry is not a constitutional inquiry but a question of statutory 
interpretation.136 This meant, of course, that the legislative 
history of the Act and the intent of Congress were controlling.  
Then, after offering a smattering of quotes and cites from past 
opinions and congressional reports, the Court shifted its gaze to 
the 1975 House Report.  In particular, the Court focused on the 
following passage: 
When it adopted a 7-year extension of the Voting 
Rights Act in 1975, Congress explicitly stated that 
“the standard (under s 5) can only be fully satisfied 
by determining on the basis of the facts found by 
the Attorney General (or the District Court) to be 
true whether the ability of minority groups to 
participate in the political process and to elect their 
choices to office is augmented, diminished, or not 
affected by the change affecting voting . . . .”137 
From this passage, the Court spun out the following standard: 
“the purpose of s 5 has always been to insure that no voting-
procedure changes would be made that would lead to a 
retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to 
their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.”138 On this view, 
 
131 Id. at 393. 
132 485 F. 2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1972). 
133 See Beer, 374 F. Supp. at 384-85. 
134 See id. at 393-99. 
135 See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976). 
136 See id. at 139. 
137 Id. at 141 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 91- 397, at 60 (1975)) (emphasis added). 
138 Id.
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a section 5 inquiry would focus on the retrogressive effect of the 
plan under review, and whether people of color were worse off 
than under the baseline as established by the previous plan.  Yet, 
almost in passing, the Court offered what seemed an important 
addendum: even if a plan is ameliorative in nature, it “cannot 
violate s 5 unless the new apportionment itself so discriminates on 
the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution.”139 Unless, 
that is, the plan violates the Fifteenth Amendment.140 
Under this standard, the Court looked to the previous plan, 
enacted in 1961, and compared it to the plan under review.   
Under the 1961 plan, people of color did not have any majorities 
in any of the districts; yet, under the reviewed 1971 plan, they 
would have one and maybe two such districts.  From these facts, 
the Court concluded that the reviewed plan did not violate the 
effects prong of the preclearance requirement. 
This is a questionable conclusion; at best, and as Justice 
Marshall underscored in dissent, it is a contested reading of the 
legislative history and the statutory language.141 One searches in 
vain for support through the congressional hearings.  The House 
hearings in 1975 never mentioned the concept of retrogression as 
the standard under which to measure the effects inquiry under 
section 5, and neither did the 1971 House hearings by the Civil 
Rights Oversight Subcommittee, from which the 1975 House 
report drew its retrogression language. 
When the Court writes that Congress “explicitly stated” its 
understanding of the preclearance standard as one of 
retrogression, it is thus hard to take even its language at face 
value.  Here is what Congress explicitly did: in the spring of 1971, 
it held hearings on “The Enforcement and Administration of the 
Voting Rights Act,” during which myriad references to section 5 
were offered.  Tellingly, none of these references made use of the 
retrogression language.  In January 1972, this same committee 
 
139 Id.
140 Keeping with its newfound posture of narrow interpretations of the Act, 
the Court managed to even restrict this seeming straightforward and logical 
reading of the law.  In Reno v. Bossier Parish, the Court remarked that “it is 
entirely clear that the statement in Beer was pure dictum: The Government had 
made no contention that the proposed reapportionment at issue was 
unconstitutional. And though we have quoted the dictum in subsequent cases, 
we have never actually applied it to deny preclearance.”  528 U.S. 320, 338 
(2000). 
141 Id. at 146 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (contending that the Court’s 
conclusion “finds no support in the language of the statute and disservices the 
legislative purposes behind s 5”). 
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issued a report, “Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in 
Mississippi,” where it recommended that the Department of 
Justice step up its preclearance responsibilities, “particularly 
where the change would have a substantial impact on the voting 
rights of many people.”142 
As for the preclearance standard, the Report explained that it 
“is not fully satisfied by an indication that the administration of 
the change affecting voting will be impartial or neutral.”143 Only 
then did the Report go on to state the language later borrowed by 
the 1975 Report and ultimately by the Court majority in Beer: the 
standard is whether the ability of people of color to participate in 
the political process and elect the representatives of their choice is 
“augmented, diminished, or not affected by the change affecting 
voting.”144 On its face, it is not altogether clear how the Beer 
majority arrives at the retrogression standard from this paragraph 
taken as a whole.  And it gets better, for the majority left out the 
best part.  Right after the ellipses, the Court didn’t think necessary 
to keep the following passage: “in view of the political, 
sociological, economic, and psychological circumstances within 
the community proposing the change.”145 So here is the relevant 
passage, in full: 
When it adopted a 7-year extension of the Voting 
Rights Act in 1975, Congress explicitly stated that 
“the standard (under s 5) can only be fully satisfied 
by determining on the basis of the facts found by 
the Attorney General (or the District Court) to be 
true whether the ability of minority groups to 
participate in the political process and to elect their 
choices to office is augmented, diminished, or not 
affected by the change affecting voting . . . . 
“. . . in view of the political, sociological, economic, 
and psychological circumstances within the 
community proposing the change.”146 
142 Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in Mississippi: A Report 
of the Civil Rights Oversight Subcomm., 92nd Cong. 14 (1972) [hereinafter 1972 
House Report]. 
143 Id.
144 Id. at 14-15. 
145 Id. at 14-15. 
146 Id. at 141 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 91- 397, at 60 (1975)) (emphasis added). 
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With the added language, the passage might be said to offer 
support for the lower court’s opinion in Beer, not the Court 
majority.  But the Court seemed intent in narrowing the scope of 
the preclearance inquiry, and contrary legislative history would 
not stand in its way, or even the fact that the litigants themselves 
did not think to argue for the standard in their briefs as the Court 
ultimately understood it.   
Beer is also remarkable for the way in which the district 
court’s analysis of the substantial meaning of section 5 differed 
from that of the Supreme Court.  Judge Robinson’s opinion is 
expansive, nuanced and arguably more faithful to Congress’ 
expansive views of the purpose behind the Act than Justice 
Stewart’s narrow opinion for the Court.  During the 1975 debates 
over extension of the Act, for example, the ninety-fourth Congress 
explicitly recognized that questions of representation and political 
fairness are difficult questions, and the question of discrimination 
in the political process was then a question of vote dilution.147 In 
this vein, it is clear that Congress in 1975 would side with Judge 
Robinson’s opinion over Justice Stewart’s. But that is one beauty 
of having five votes on the Court; one needn’t worry about being 
right.  And as for reading the statute narrowly, it is also clear that 
this wouldn’t be the last time. 
2. Bossier Parish and the Triumph of Retrogression 
The 1990’s proved fertile ground for litigants challenging the 
limits of the Act.   This was a time when many covered 
jurisdictions had a very difficult time securing preclearance for 
their districting plans, thus offering the Court myriad 
opportunities to leave its lasting imprint on the preclearance 
requirement.  The attempt by the Bossier Parish School Board to 
redraw its district lines to comport with the equipopulation 
standard proved no exception.  The Board’s plan, modeled after a 
previously approved plan, was denied preclearance by the 
Department of Justice because a plan presented to the Board by 
the NAACP had been able to create two majority black districts, 
whereas the submitted plan had none.  More specifically, the 
Attorney General had objected to the Board’s plan because, as 
required by its own regulations, she must withhold preclearance 
when “necessary to prevent a clear violation of amended section 
 
147 See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, Rethinking Section 
5 of the Voting Rights Act, in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (Epstein et 
al., eds., forthcoming 2006).  
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2.”148 On appeal, the lower court precleared the plan,149 and the 
Supreme Court ultimately faced two separate questions: whether 
a violation of section 2 demands a denial of preclearance under 
section 5; and whether the Attorney General must preclear a plan 
enacted with discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose. 
a. Uncoupling Section 2 from Section 5 
In Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board,150 the Court 
answered the first question in the negative.  To the Court, making 
a violation of section 2 a basis for denying preclearance under 
section 5 would mean that the Department of Justice “would 
‘routinely’ attempt to avail themselves of this new reason for 
denying preclearance.”151 This would mean that “for all intent and 
purposes” the standard of section 2 would replace the standard 
under section 5, and the retrogression inquiry would be replaced 
by a vote dilution inquiry.  The Court soundly rejected this 
position, for it contradicted existing doctrine and further 
increased the “serious federalism costs already implicated by § 
5.”152 
This was a debatable conclusion, for it elevates the 
retrogression inquiry above the structure of the Act and the intent 
of Congress.  On the first point, it is clear that Section 2 was 
intended as a restatement of the 15th Amendment,153 and the bill 
as a whole was aimed at enforcing the same amendment.  In turn, 
Section 5 was intended to prevent states from violating the 15th 
Amendment in ways that Congress could not foresee in 1965.  Or 
as Armand Derfner explained during the 1971 Hearings, “Section 5 
was a look down the road to prevent, in advance, stratagems 
whose nature was unknown but which Congress knew would be 
forthcoming when literacy tests were abolished.”154 As enacted in 
 
148 See Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 520 U.S. 471, 476 (1997) 
(citing 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b)(2). 
149 See Bossier Parish School Board v. Reno, 907 F. Supp. 434 (D.D.C. 
1995). 
150 520 U.S. 471 (1997). 
151 Id. at 477. 
152 Id. at 480 (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926 (1995)). 
153 See To Enforce the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States: Senate Unpublished Hearing on S. 1564, 89th Cong., Vol. I, 4 
(1965). 
154 The Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings Before Civil Rts. 
Oversight Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong. 255 
(1971) [hereinafter 1971 House Hearings]. 
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1965, then, it must be the case that Section 5 would incorporate 
Section 2, for the crux of the preclearance requirement was 
preventing future violations of the Fifteenth Amendment as 
codified under Section 2.  Put another way, Section 5 was not 
concerned with the applicable standards under Section 2 as much 
with the enactment of electoral provisions that would violate the 
fifteenth amendment.  And so long as Section 2 was a restatement 
of the Fifteenth Amendment, Section 5 would by definition 
incorporate Section 2.  This argument has not only the legislative 
record on its side, but logic – and perhaps experience – as well. 
In fairness, the 1982 Amendments might be understood as 
altering this reading of the Act.  Yet, in fact, the congressional 
reaction to City of Mobile, does not affect the larger argument.  It 
is worth noting, first and foremost, that Congress was responding 
to yet another narrow reading of the statutory language; in City of 
Mobile v. Bolden,155 the Court understood Section 2 as Congress 
had understood it, as a restatement of the Fifteenth Amendment.  
This meant, as the Court underscored, that the standard under 
Section 2 would be one of discriminatory intent, rather than the 
more flexible and forgiving standard of discriminatory effect.  
Congress soon altered this reading of Section 2 in 1982, 
uncoupling the statutory requirement from its constitutional 
anchor and requiring a finding of discriminatory effect instead. 
To the Court, this Amendment made all the difference in the 
world.  On their original rendition, the target of Sections 2 and 5 
was the same, racial discrimination in voting, both in the present 
and into the future.  In amending the Act, however, Section 2 
ceased to simply restate the constitutional standard as the Court 
understood it.  This had grave repercussions for the Section 5 
inquiry and the argument that Section 5 incorporated a Section 2 
inquiry, according to the Court in Bossier Parish. Namely, it 
would shift the preclearance inquiry from non-retrogression to 
vote dilution and call into question the Beer non-retrogression 
standard.  It would also raise the already serious “federalism 
costs” exacted by Section 5, and in so doing might push the Act to 
the brink of unconstitutionality.  Tellingly, the Court also 
remained unimpressed by the Attorney General’s regulations, 
which interpreted section 5 as requiring a denial of preclearance if 
in violation of section 2; and by considerations of public policy, 
which counseled against a grant of preclearance for electoral 
changes that would ultimately violate Section 2.156 
155 446 U.S. 52 (1980). 
156 See Bossier Parish, 520 U.S. at 483-85. 
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These arguments must be read in the context of the times and 
the Court’s dissatisfaction with the Department of Justice’s 
handling of its preclearance responsibilities.157 To the Court, the 
Department of Justice had pushed its reading of the Act – a 
reading that the Court understood as one of maximizing majority 
minority districts – too far and ultimately rendered the resulting 
state actions unconstitutional.  Hence, Section 2 had ceased to be 
a measure of the 15th Amendment but, rather, a tool of public 
policy and the yardstick for what a proper structure of 
representation would look like.158 On this view, it is easy and 
perhaps unavoidable to conclude that Section 5 does not 
incorporate Section 2. 
It must be noted, however, how this posture comes in direct 
tension with the classic voting rights decisions of the 1960’s and 
the Court’s forgiving interpretations of congressional power.  
Under Katzenbach v. Morgan,159 for example, the Court allowed 
Congress the room to interpret rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment beyond what the Court itself would recognize.  Such 
an argument under the Morgan power would mean that Congress 
could interpret the Fifteenth Amendment under Section 2 of the 
Act more expansively than the Court allowed in City of Mobile.
On this view, Section 5 would still incorporate Section 2 under 
Congress’ reading of a constitutional violation under the 
Amendment.  But the Court was not interested in this argument.  
Once Congress offered a different reading of the Amendment 
through Section 2 of the Act, Section 5 could no longer be used to 
enforce Section 2 into the future.160 
Regardless of one’s stance about the Court’s views on 
congressional power, it is also intriguing how the Court spends so 
little time – if any – sorting through the legislative materials, and 
how selective the Court chooses to be when doing so.  In this vein, 
recall how in Beer the Court was much too willing to ground the 
doctrine on its debatable reading of the House report.  Yet, in 
Bossier Parish, the Court proved unwilling to accept language 
 
157 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 917-18 (1995); Johnson v. 
Miller, 864 F.Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (contending that by the third round of 
submissions from Georgia to the Department of Justice, “[i]t was now clear to 
the General Assembly that preclearance would not be forthcoming without 
adopting this raison d'être of the max-black proposals. This goal dominated the 
creation of the third Georgia submission.”); Ellen D. Katz, Federalism, 
Preclearance, and the Rehnquist Court, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1179 (2001). 
158 See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
159 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
160 See Bossier Parish, 520 U.S. at 481-82. 
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from the House and Senate Reports that, according to Justice 
Stevens and anyone willing to engage the Reports at all, 
unequivocally expressed a congressional intent to incorporate 
Section 2 within the preclearance dictates of Section 5.  According 
to the Senate Report, for example, “[i]n light of the Amendment to 
section 2, it is intended that a section 5 objection also follow if a 
new voting procedure itself so discriminates as to violate section 
2.”161 In a subsequent report four years later, a House 
subcommittee similarly concluded that “it is a proper 
interpretation of the legislative history of the 1982 amendments to 
use Section 2 standards in the course of making Section 5 
determinations.”162 But the Court was not interested in such 
technical matters.  Its questionable adoption of the retrogression 
standard in Beer ruled the day.   
b. Turning the Act on its Head: Preclearing Discrimination 
And two years later, in Bossier Parish II,163 it ruled the day 
again.  The question this time was whether the Department of 
Justice must preclear a redistricting plan enacted with 
discriminatory but non-retrogressive purpose.  Unsurprisingly, 
the Court also answered this question in narrow fashion, 
construing the language of the statute as requiring a denial of 
preclearance under the purpose prong of section 5 only for 
retrogressive dilution.164 After Bossier Parish, the retrogression 
standard would apply not only to the discriminatory effects 
inquiry, but to the question of discriminatory purpose as well. 
The best that can be said for this reading of the statute is that 
it was “outlandish”.165 The Court began by looking to the relevant 
language, under which a covered jurisdiction must show that its 
proposed change “does not have the purpose and will not have the 
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race 
or color.”166 From this language, the argument was disarmingly 
simple: if the effect prong of the statute required a retrogression 
inquiry, the Court concluded that it must interpret the purpose 
prong similarly since, “[a]s we have in the past, we refuse to adopt 
 
161 S.R. Rep. No. 97-417, at 12 n. 31 (1982) (cited in Bossier Parish, 520 
U.S. at 505-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
162 Voting Rights Act: Proposed Section 5 Regulations: Report 5 (1986). 
163 528 U.S. 320 (2000). 
164 See id. at 328. 
165 Id. at 360 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
166 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c). 
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a construction that would attribute different meanings to the 
same phrase in the same sentence, depending on which object it is 
modifying.”167 Thus, following Beer, retrogression would become 
the hallmark of the preclearance inquiry. 
This is an outlandish conclusion because it does not even 
pretend to comport with the structure of the statute and the intent 
of Congress.  The reason for including a preclearance 
requirement, according to Attorney General Katzenbach, was to 
subject “the State which had been discriminating in the past . . . to 
some kind of limitations as to any new legislation that it might 
propose.”168 Or, as he explained during the Senate hearings, the 
preclearance requirement “is an attempt to prevent new laws 
which would frustrate the objectives of Congress here.”169 During 
his testimony in front of the House subcommittee, Joseph Rauh 
explained the need for the preclearance requirement as follows: 
You are about, I take it, to pass legislation to 
remedy previous discrimination. All you are saying 
here is, “We are not going to permit-new evasive 
devices, we are going to freeze the situation as it is 
today unless new tests have been brought to court 
and found to be nondiscriminatory.” 
I would say this provision is simply self-defense of 
Congress. The States you are now seeking to 
prevent from discriminating— this is a way of 
preventing those States from finding a new method 
of discrimination. I think this is a necessary part of 
the self-defense of the bill you are about to enact.170 
If Section 5 stood for anything at all in the eyes of the 89th 
Congress, it would be the view that the Attorney General must not 
preclear electoral changes that discriminated on the basis of race.  
Nothing that Congress did during the debates of 1969, 1975 or 
1982 refute this central premise of the Act.    
Yet to the Court, “this is simply an untenable construction of 
the text.”171 Not only is the Court’s reading of the Act necessitated 
 
167 Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 329. 
168 1965 House Hearing, supra note 7, at 60 (Attorney General 
Katzenbach). 
169 1965 Senate Hearing, supra note 7, at 172. 
170 1965 House Hearing, supra note 7, at 399. 
171 Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 329. 
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by the language of the statute, the Court argues, but a contrary 
reading of the purpose prong as reaching non-retrogressive vote 
dilution practices “would also exacerbate the ‘substantial’ 
federalism costs that the preclearance procedure already exacts . . 
. perhaps to the extent of raising concerns about § 5’s 
constitutionality.”172 And this might really be the crux of the 
matter, irrespective of any congressional intent. Had Congress 
really intended to reach non-retrogressive state actions through 
the purpose prong of Section 5, the Court suggests that this would 
be unconstitutional.   
To be as charitable as possible, the Court’s position simply 
makes no sense.  Why couldn’t Congress determine that a purpose 
inquiry could precede the implementation of a statute in covered 
jurisdictions?  The Court does not say.  For support, it cites Miller 
v. Johnson’s admonition that the Department of Justice’s 
maximization policy extends beyond the reach of the statute and 
is in direct tension with constitutional norms.173 But this hardly 
offers any persuasive support.  And further, the retrogression 
standard was not a concession to any “serious federalism costs,” 
but rather a simple matter of statutory interpretation and 
legislative intent.  To suggest that the adoption of any standard 
other than retrogression would render the Act unconstitutional is 
a baffling proposition.  To be sure, the Court does not spend any 
time defending this claim. 
In the end, the Court offered a lawyerly brief, chock full of 
technical arguments and distinguished cases.  If a precedent 
seemed to stand in its way, its conclusion would be “nothing more 
than an ex necessitate limitation upon the effect prong in the 
particular context of annexation;”174 or the case would “involve an 
unusual fact pattern,”175 or contrary language would be “pure 
dictum.”176 Such is the beauty of a Court majority and a 
willingness to reach a particular outcome; counter arguments and 
contrary cases seldom offer enough resistance. 
 
172 Id. at 336. 
173 See id. (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926-27 (1995)). 
174 Id. at 330 (referring to Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 
(1975)).  
175 Id. at 339 (referring to Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 
(1987)). 
176 Id. at 338 (referring to language in Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 
(1976)). 
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3. Georgia’s Misadventures Come to an End: Georgia v. Ashcroft 
If Beer and the Bossier Parish cases show the beauty of 
counting to five, a recent case, Georgia v. Ashcroft,177 shows a 
different kind of beauty: if one waits long enough, legal doctrine is 
likely to come full circle.  In Georgia, the Court offered its latest 
examination of the retrogression standard.  This time around, the 
standard took on a loose yet nuanced – and some might say 
worthless – persona.178 The doctrinal terrain prior to Georgia 
bears repeating: a voting change that discriminates against voters 
of color must be precleared if non-retrogressive.179 In fact, the 
retrogression inquiry cares little about how unconstitutional the 
challenged plan may be; it only cares about whether the plan 
“preserves ‘current minority voting strength.’”180 The Court in 
Bossier Parish reached this conclusion on the strength of the 
statutory language,181 and for good measure; had the Court 
focused on the legislative history, the result would have been 
different. 
Be that as it may, Georgia is important for the way in which 
the Court can be understood as connecting the inquiry back to the 
concerns raised by Congress a generation before.  Consider first 
the inquiry as the Court understood it: to determine what an 
“effective exercise of the electoral franchise”182 means.  To the 
Court, this inquiry “depend[ed] on an examination of all the 
relevant circumstances, such as the ability of voters to elect their 
candidate of choice, the extent of the minority group’s opportunity 
to participate in the political process, and the feasibility of 
creating a nonretrogressive plan.”183 This was a “totality of 
circumstances” inquiry, the Court explained, and a flexible and 
forgiving inquiry to boot.  No one factor would be determinative 
and, in specific reference to districting plans, jurisdictions would 
retain much flexibility in choosing which theory of representation 
to reflect in their plans.184 
177 539 U.S. 461 (2003). 
178 See Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of 
Retrogression, 3 ELECTION L.J. 21 (2004). 
179 See Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 341 (2000). 
180 Georgia, 539 U.S. at 477 (citing City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 
U.S. 125, 134 n.10 (1983)). 
181 Bossier Parrish, 528 U.S. at 328-33. 
182 Georgia, 539 U.S. at 479. 
183 Id.
184 See id. at 482. 
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One way to read the Georgia case is as Justice Souter read it: 
as leaving nothing of the preclearance inquiry as Congress must 
have envisioned it.  Consider in this vein the words of Attorney 
General Katzenbach during the Senate hearings on the need for 
preclearance:  
It occurred to us that there are other ways in which 
States can discriminate, and we have had 
experience with State legislative efforts in other 
areas, for example, limiting the registrars to very 
short periods of time, or the imposition of either 
very high poll taxes or property taxes which would 
have the effect of denying or abridging rights 
guaranteed under the 15th Amendment, that kind of 
law should be covered, too. 
This was put in with an effort of not letting a State 
legislature continue past practices of 
discrimination, preventing that or subjecting that 
to judicial review, somewhat the same way that 
State reapportionment plans are subjected to 
judicial review in order to determine their 
constitutionality.185 
If this is in fact what the Johnson administration and the 89th 
Congress had in mind for the preclearance inquiry, then clearly 
there is very little left of it.  Under modern doctrine, the courts 
must preclear even those plans that are found to discriminate 
against people of color; and under Georgia, reviewing courts must 
read the facts flexibly and forgivingly, making a finding of 
retrogression even more unlikely than originally presumed.  
Under the law as it now stands, it is clear that very few plans will 
be fail to gain preclearance. 
Yet, for my purposes, Georgia has a silver lining as well.  
Recall that in Allen, the Court offered an expansive view of the 
right to vote and the coverage of the Act, recasting the 
preclearance inquiry as inter alia a dilution inquiry.  And in Beer,
the lower court similarly offered an expansive account of political 
life in New Orleans, which made a finding of racial discrimination 
in voting more likely.  Georgia takes us back to these cases, if 
obliquely so, and to the 1975 congressional hearings.  The issue 
then was one of political power and full and effective participation 
 
185 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 237. 
Collaboration 
 
42 
in the political process.  These are the same issues that permeate 
Georgia’s majority opinion.  I do not wish to be misunderstood, 
however; I agree with Justice Souter’s dissent that this view of 
retrogression empties section five of any remaining substantive 
content.  Looking back to the early congressional debates and the 
clear goals of the Act, and when thinking about the misadventures 
in the redistricting terrain during the 1990’s in North Carolina, 
Texas, and Georgia, to name a few leading examples, it is not clear 
whether this is such a bad thing after all. 
IV. Conclusion: The Ebbs and Flows in Voting 
Rights Law, and Looking Ahead to Reauthorization 
The previous Part offered a simple and straightforward lesson: 
the substance of the Act has ebbed and flowed in accordance with 
the Court’s composition and its predetermined notions of 
congressional powers and the natural reach of the Act.  In the 
early years, the Court stepped aside and offered a broad reading of 
congressional powers and the reach of the Act.  This posture was 
in synch with the legislative history and congressional wishes; in 
light of the many uncertainties surrounding the Act and its 
constitutionality, Congress drafted a statute in broad and 
forgiving language.  The Court in the early years of the Act 
followed the congressional script and behaved in true Dahlian 
fashion, as a member of the national policy-making coalition.  The 
Court could have stood in the way of Congress and civil rights, to 
be sure, but it seldom does so, and the mid-1960’s were not an 
exception to this rule. 
The election of President Nixon’s election in 1968 marked a 
period of retrenchment on civil rights.  This changing posture is 
reflected during the 1969 reauthorization debates in Congress.  
These hearings saw Attorney General Mitchell speak on behalf of 
the administration and defend its push to expand the reach of the 
Act nationwide.   The Attorney General disputed this 
characterization, of course; as he repeated numerous times during 
his testimony, the administration’s position should not be 
interpreted as a retrenchment on the promise, but simply as a way 
by which to apply the tenets of the Act on a fairer basis.  But many 
members of Congress remained unpersuaded.  To them, the 
administration was simply following through on its Southern 
Strategy, a promise to the Southern states to turn back on the 
goals of the Voting Rights Act. 
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Congress did not agree with the administration on this key 
issue of coverage and extended the Act for another five years 
virtually unchanged.  But supporters of the administration’s goals 
would not have to wait long.  In the case of Beer v. United States,
and in true Dahlian fashion, a Supreme Court majority – with 3 
new Nixon appointees in tow – began to restrict the scope of the 
Act through narrow interpretations of the statutory language.  It 
mattered little that neither the text nor the legislative history 
offered much support for these new and unforgiving 
interpretations of the statute.  This was to be expected, as the 
national mood had clearly shifted ten years after conditions had 
proven to be ideal for passage of a strong voting rights bill. 
To be sure, the pendulum swung again towards broad 
interpretations of the statute; the case of Gingles v. Thornburg,
for example, may be considered one such instance, and U.S. v. 
Board Of Commissioners of Sheffield, Alabama,186 decided in 
1978, is clearly another.  In the 1990’s, the pendulum swung back 
with a vengeance; in case after case, from Presley v. Etowah 
County187 to Shaw v. Reno188 and Miller v. Johnson189 to the 
Bossier Parish cases, the Court once again interpreted the 
statutory language in narrow fashion.  As the Court adjusts to its 
new membership and looks ahead to the coming reauthorization 
battles, and if its behavior is any indication, the national mood is 
clearly against expansive, intrusive interpretations of the Act.   
This development has been nothing short of ironic.  Public 
discourse is often filled with talk of strict constructionism and 
judicial activism.  The debate often fails to cross party and 
ideological labels, with so-called strict constructionists often 
found right of center and those who believe in the notion of a 
living Constitution found to the left.  In recent days, for example, 
Justice Scalia referred to those who refer to the Constitution as a 
living document as “idiots.”190 Yet, as this Article argues, the life 
of the Voting Rights Act in Court has turned this orthodoxy on its 
head.  Congress clearly wished for the Court to expand the scope 
of the Act aggressively, to the limits of constitutional 
interpretation, and the Court in the early years did precisely that.  
 
186 435 U.S. 110 (1978). 
187 502 U.S. 491 (1992). 
188 509 U. S. 630 (1993). 
189 515 U.S. 500 (1995). 
190 Scalia Raps 'Living Constitution', http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
stories/2006/02/14/supremecourt/main1315619.shtml (last visited March 2, 
2006) ("You would have to be an idiot to believe that. The Constitution is not a 
living organism, it is a legal document.") 
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But these early examples proved to be exceptions rather than a 
matter of course, and soon enough Congress could no longer 
count on the Court to carry out its statutory purposes. 
As we look to 2007 and the looming reauthorization battle, it 
is clear that Congress must be clear in its intentions.  Whatever 
Congress wants done, it must explicitly state as part of the 
congressional record and the language of the statute.  Otherwise, 
and if the life of the Act is any indication, Congress must be 
content with the likely possibility that the Court will read the 
resulting congressional handiwork narrowly.  To be sure, and if 
the Bossier Parrish cases are any indication, it may be said that 
Congress does not stand a chance, as the Court will do with the 
statute whatever it decides to do.  Nothing less can be expected 
from an institution that seldom deviates from the national mood 
and larger trends in public opinion.  And yet, at least if it wishes to 
have a clear say during the early years of a reauthorized Act, it 
should be amply clear that Congress must say what it means and 
mean what it says.  For, if Congress leaves it up to the Court, it 
might not like the results it gets. 
